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Europe is once again subject to an epidemic of wall and barrier building. The war in 
Ukraine is accompanied by the fortification of its border with Russia, while the Baltic 
UHSXEOLFV DUH FUHDWLQJ WKH IRXQGDWLRQV IRU ZKDW LV DQ HPEU\RQLF QHZ µLURQ FXUWDLQ¶
dividing the Atlantic community from Eurasia. Elsewhere fences are being built to halt 
the flow of refugees and migrants. These new barriers symbolise the failure to build a 
(XURSH µZKROH DQG IUHH¶ LQ WKH SRVW-Cold War era, and the failure of the era of 
globalisation to create the conditions for security and development in (XURSH¶V
neighbourhood 7KH VSDWH RI µZDOOLQJ¶ UHIOHFWV QRW WKH VWUHQJWK of national sovereignty 
but its weakness, and not the power of the Atlantic community to spread prosperity, 
peace and security but the opposite. The era of globalisation is accompanied by 
deepening disjuncture and contradictions, and European leaders have no coherent 
response. The roots of the crisis lie in the patterns established at the close of the original 
Cold War in the late perestroika years, with a power shift rather than the transcending 
politics espoused by Mikhail Gorbachev. The Malta summit of 1989 only partially 
UHSXGLDWHGWKHSROLWLFVRI<DOWD7KHDV\PPHWULFDOHQGRIWKH&ROG:DUDQGWKH\HDUV¶
crisis represented by the subsequent cold peace contained within itself the violence and 
the new divisions that now predominate. The myths and mistakes of the cold peace era 
need to be challenged and a new transformative politics envisaged. 
 
Key words: Cold War, Berlin Wall, Ukraine, liminality, Yalta, Malta, Mikhail 
Gorbachev, H.W. Bush, NATO, cold peace. 
 
 
The fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 and the subsequent end of the Cold War 
encouraged expectations of a new era of reconciliation and healing in Europe.1 Mikhail 
*RUEDFKHY¶V µQHZSROLWLFDO WKLQNLQJ¶ tried to transcend not only the division of Europe 
but also the very logic that had divided WKHZRUOG LQWRµ(DVW¶DQGµ:HVW¶He sought to 
overcome the historical division between revolutionary and social democracy to create a 
QHZW\SHRIVRFLHW\WKDWUHPDLQHGOR\DOWRZKDWKHFDOOHGWKHµVRFLDOLVWFKRLFH¶DVZHOODV
to the classical tenets of representative democracy. 7KH µ&KDUWHU RI 3DULV IRU D 1HZ
(XURSH¶ DGRSWHG E\ D SOHQDU\ PHHWLQJ RI DOO WKH KHDGV RI VWDWH RU JRYHUQPHQW RI WKH
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) at a meeting on 19-21 
                                                 
1
 An earlier version of this paper was published in Polis, No. 4, 2015, pp. 46-63, in Russian, with 
the original English version on the website: http://www.politstudies.ru/en/article/5018. I would 
like to thank the two anonymous reviewers, whose extremely helpful comments have helped 
shape this much-revised version of the paper, as well as my colleagues at the University of Kent, 
Glenn Bowman and Keith Hayward.  
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November 1990, acted as the manifesto for the new era, stressing WKDW µ7KH HUD RI
confrontation and division in Europe has ended. We declare that henceforth our relations 
will be founded on respect and cooperation [...] Europe whole and free is calling for a 
QHZEHJLQQLQJ¶2  Instead, on the 25th anniversary of the dismantling of the µLURQFXUWDLQ¶
across Germany and Europe, Ukraine announced plans to build a new wall along its 
2,295 kilometre-long border with Russia.  
On 16 June 2014 the head of the National Security and Defence Council, Andrei 
3DUXEL\ VWDWHG WKDW EXLOGLQJ WKH ZDOO ZRXOG µDYRLG DQ\ IXWXUH SURYRFDWLRQV IURP WKH
5XVVLDQVLGH¶3 The Ukrainian Prime Minister, Arseny Yatsenyuk, on 5 September 2014 
announced that the SODQ LPDJLQDWLYHO\QDPHGµ:DOO¶ RUµ(XURSHDQ5DPSDUW¶, had been 
adopted, and construction of the fortifications began soon after. In the first instance there 
would be a four-metre wide and two-metre deep ditch equipped with electronic 
surveillance systems, towers and other structures.4 The wall would also separate the 
contending sides in the Donbass, reinforcing the economic and social blockade. As the 
deputy commander of the anti-terrorist operation (ATO), colonel Valentyn Fedychev, put 
LWWKHIROORZLQJ$SULOµ8NUDLQHKDVWRVSHQGDORWRIPRQH\± about 1 billion hryvnia ± to 
WUDQVIRUPWKHGHPDUFDWLRQOLQHLQWRDIRUWUHVVLPSUHJQDEOHIRU5XVVLDQRFFXSLHUV¶5 This 
was an attempt physically to separate Ukraine from Russia, and reflected the deeper 
psychological and political gulf between the two countries. Yet for many in the Donbass, 
the border had long been considered artificial and imposed. With the creation of the 
'RQHWVNDQG/XJDQVNSHRSOH¶VUHSXEOLFV.LHYORVWFRQWURORIVRPHRIWKHQHDU-2000   
km land border.6 Russia also began to fortify its part of the frontier bordering the 
insurgent region, in part to control the flow of weapons and militants in both directions.7 
<DWVHQ\XNQRWHGWKDWZKDWKDGQRZEHFRPHNQRZQDVWKHµ*UHDW:DOORI8NUDLQH¶would 
improve national security, improve the business climate and fDFLOLWDWH 8NUDLQH¶V
PHPEHUVKLSRI1$72DQGWKH(8)RUKLPWKHIRUWLILFDWLRQVZRXOGVHUYHDV(XURSH¶VGH
facto eastern boundary.8 How can we explain the return of the wall as the metonym for 
our times, and what does it say about the quality of international political relationships? 
                                                 
2
 µ&KDUWHU RI 3DULV IRU D 1HZ (XURSH¶ 3DULV -21 November 1990, 
http://www.osce.org/node/39516. 
3
 ,DQD.RUHWVNDµ&KDQJHVWRWHUURULVPODZJLYH8NUDLQHIRUFHVILJKWLQJFKDQce to defeat Eastern 
LQVXUJHQF\¶ Kyiv Post, 20 June 2014, http://www.kyivpost.com/content/ukraine/changes-to-
terrorism-law-give-ukraine-forces-fighting-chance-to-defeat-eastern-insurgency-352701.html, 
accessed 16 July 2015. 
4
 µ8NUDLQLDQ ERUGHU JXDUGV VWDUW EXLOGLQJ ZDOO¶ ,7$5-TASS, 10 September 2014, 
http://tass.ru/en/world/748902, accessed 5 May 2015. 
5
 µ)RUWLILFDWLRQ ZRUN RQ GHPDUFDWLRQ OLQH LQ 'RQEDV WR FRVW 8$+  EOQ ± ATO deputy 
FRPPDQGHU¶ ,QWHUID[-Ukraine, 8 April 2015, 
http://en.interfax.com.ua/news/economic/259416.html, accessed 16 July 2015. 
6
 7DWLDQD =KXU]KHQNR µ8NUDLQH¶V (DVWHUQ %RUGHUODQGV 7KH (QG RI $PELJXLW\¶ LQ $QGUHZ
Wilson, (ed.), What Does Ukraine Think? (London, European Council on Foreign Relations, 
2015), pp. 45-52. 
7
 3HWU .R]ORY (YJHQLL 5DNXO¶ DQG $OHNVHL 1LNRO¶VNLL µ5RY QDSURWLY UYD 5RVVLLVNLH
SRJUDQLFKQLNLXNUHSO\D\XWJUDQLWVXV'RQEDVVRPNDNLXNUDLQVNLHQRGHNODULUX\XWGUXJLHWVHOL¶
Vedomosti, 27 May 2015, p. 3.  
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Walls, culture and power 
 
Some 274 people died along the Berlin Wall between it going up in August 1961 to its 
dismantling in November 1989, whereas already thousands have died in Ukraine. The 
Russo-Ukrainian border is only slightly shorter that the US-Mexican border, whose 3,141 
kilometre length is now secured with increasingly ramified fences and intruder detection 
systems. The building of the Ukrainian wall demonstrated that a new iron curtain 
threatened to divide Europe, no ORQJHU µfrom Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the 
$GULDWLF¶DV:LQVWRQ&KXUFKLOOSXWLWLQKLVVSHHFKDQQRXQFLQJWKH&ROG:DULQ)XOWRQ
Missouri, on 5 March 1946, but from Narva on the Baltic to Mariupol on the Sea of 
Azov. Churchill was not the first WRXVHWKHSKUDVHµLURQFXUWDLQ¶,Wwas coined by Ethel 
Snowden in her book about her visit to Soviet Russia in 1920 as part of the British 
Labour DHOHJDWLRQUHIHUULQJWRWKHOHYHORILJQRUDQFHWKDWµVHSDUDWHGWKHFRXQWULHVRIWKH
West from Soviet RussiD¶9 7KLVµLURQFXUWDLQ¶LVLIDQ\WKLQJPRUHLPSHQHWUDEOHWKDQHYHU
before  
,QKLV VWXG\RI WKH WHUP3DWULFN:ULJKWGHVFULEHV WKH µYHUWLFDO¶DQG µKRUL]RQWDO¶
patterns of the division of humanity.10 This is vividly illustrated by European responses to 
the pressure of refugees and migrants at its frontiers. Spain has turned its enclaves of 
Ceuta and Melilla in North Africa into heavily fortified bastions, while in 2014 Bulgaria 
built a fence along its border with Turkey, forcing refugees to undertake the perilous sea 
crossing to the Greek island of Kos. In 2015 Hungary followed suit to build a four-metre 
high fence along its 110-mile border with Serbia.11 7KH(8¶VDV\OXPV\VWHPIRUPDOLVHG
LQ WKH 'XEOLQ 5HJXODWLRQ SHQDOLVHV WKRVH IURQWOLQH FRXQWULHV DW (XURSH¶s borders. A 
UHFHQW VWXG\ DUJXHV WKDW µ7KH LQDELOLW\ RI WKH (XURSHDQ 8QLRQ WR DJUHH D PHDQLQJIXO
UHVSRQVHWRWKHFXUUHQWPLJUDQWFULVLVLVQRWRQO\GLVJUDFHIXOLWULVNVGHILQLQJWKH8QLRQ¶V
OHJDF\DVD VSHFWDFXODU IDLOXUH¶12 Such a perception is reinforced by Estonia¶V plans to 
build an eight foot-high metal fence reinforced by barbed wire, ostensibly to keep out 
illegal immigrants, along its 108-kilometre border with Russia.13 This really would be the 
EHJLQQLQJRIDQHZµLURQFXUWDLQ¶DQGOLNHWKHWUHQFKHs in 1914, could gradually snake its 
way down to the Black Sea and once again divide Europe. In earlier years the EU had 
done much to try to soften its frontiers through the establishment of trans-border regions 
                                                                                                                                                 
along-russian-border-set-for-completion-before-late-2018-pm-428981.html, accessed 16 July 
2015. 
9
 Robert Service, Spies and Commissars: Bolshevik Russia and the West (New York, Public 
Affairs, 2012), p. 92. 
10
 Patrick Wright, Iron Curtain: From Stage to Cold War (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
2009). 
11
 3DWULFN .LQJVHO\ µ:H¶YH come so far ± your wall wRQ¶W stop us, desperate migrants warn 
HungaU\¶VlHDGHUV¶Guardian, 22 June 2015, p. 15. 
12
 Françoise Sivignon anG-DQLFH+XJKHVµ(XURSH¶V5HIXJHH&ULVLV%ULGJHVQRW)HQFHV$UHWKH
$QVZHU¶2SHQGHPRFUDF\6HSWHPEHUDYDLODEOHDWhttps://www.opendemocracy.net/can-
europe-make-it/fran%C3%A7oise-sivignon-janice-hughes/europe%E2%80%99s-refugee-crisis-
bridges-not-fences-are-a, accessed 9 September 2015. 
13
 $UWHP.XUHHYµ&DQ(VWRQLD%XLOGD1HZ%HUOLQ:DOO%HWZHHQ5XVVLDDQGWKH:HVW"¶Russia 
Direct, 2 September 2015, available at http://www.russia-direct.org/opinion/can-estonia-build-
new-berlin-wall-between-russia-and-west, accessed 9 September 2015. 
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and programmes like the Northern Dimension, but in the end these initiatives were 
overwhelmed by the failure to achieve a comprehensive and inclusive post-Cold War 
political settlement.14 
In the case of Ukraine, the divisions that have accompanied state building since 
1991 have profound local causes, EXWWKHODQJXDJHRIWKHµQHZ&ROG:DU¶HQGRZs them 
with a more universal geopolitical significance. Ukraine has long been torn between 
µ(XUDVLD¶DQGµ(XURSH¶ZLWKWKHWHQGHQF\WRUHLI\ERWKWHUPVDefenders of the Ukrainian 
wall argue that this one is different, designed no longer to oppress people within its 
confines, but like the Great Wall of China, to keep the barbarians out. The revised name 
RI µWKH /LQH RI 'LJQLW\¶ HFKRHV (DVW *HUPDQ\¶V QDPH IRU WKH %HUOLQ :DOO µWKH $QWL-
)DVFLVW3URWHFWLRQ5DPSDUW¶. The Separation Wall in Palestine is also claimed to defend 
civilians, as are the defences around Gaza. Glenn Bowman has likened the blockade of 
*D]DWRWKHGXDOPHDQLQJRIµHQF\VWDWLRQ¶WKHUDGLFDOLVRODWLRQRIGLVHDVHGHOHPHQWVDQG
the protection of a foetus in the womb. The quarantining of Gaza in his view has 
established mechanisms for the future containment of West Bank Palestinians.15 
The Separation Wall reinforces the Israeli presence in the occupied West Bank. 
Equally, the radical imposition of a state of exception on the people of the Donbas 
H[HPSWHGWKHPIURPWKHSROLWLFDOSURFHVVE\ODEHOOLQJWKHPµWHUURULVWV¶while subjecting 
them to extreme assault in the form of WKH µ$QWL-7HUURULVW 2SHUDWLRQ¶ $72 7KH
dehumanisation of the population deprived them of the legal and political protection of 
the nation state and pushed them into the extraterritorial limbo status analysed so 
powerfully by Giorgio Agamben. As he argues, µ7KHH[FHSWLRQWKDWGHILQHVWKHVWUXFWXUH
of sovereignty is [...] complex. Here what is outside is included not simply by means of 
an interdiction or an internment, but rather by means of the suspension of the juridical 
RUGHU¶VYDOLGLW\± by letting the juridical order, that is, withdraw from the exception and 
DEDQGRQ LW¶16 The blockade of the Donbas deprived its peoples of pensions, welfare 
services and the basic means of survival. Over 500 civilians were killed by shelling from 
Ukrainian positions in the first eight months of 2015 alone. Walls and war have returned 
to the continent and to world politics, accompanied by new forms of vertical and 
horizontal separation. 
 0DNDU\FKHY DQG <DWV\N DUJXH WKDW SROLWLFDO ERUGHUV DUH µODUJHO\ SHUFHSWLRQDO
SKHQRPHQD¶ DQG VWUHVV WKDW µ(XURSH DV D FRQVWUXFW ODFNV FOHDU ERUGHUOLQHV¶17 They 
analyse the WHQVLRQLQERWKWKH(8DQG5XVVLDEHWZHHQVWUDWHJLHVWKDWµXQORFN¶ERUGHUV
and those that reinforce divisions. They note that value-oriented approaches are 
µFRQGXFLYH WR DUWLFXODWLQJ DQG IL[LQJ QRUPDWLYH ERUGHUV ZLWK 5XVVLD¶ ZKLOH LQWHUHVW-
oriented aSSURDFKHVIRVWHUµmore economic openness and less restrictive border crossing 
                                                 
14
 For perceptive discussions of the issue, see Ilkka Liikanen, James W. Scott and Tiina Sotkasiira 
(eds), 0LJUDWLRQ%RUGHUVDQG5HJLRQDO6WDELOLW\ LQ WKH(8¶V(DVWHUQ1HLJKERXUKRRG (London, 
Routledge, forthcoming 2016).  
15
 *OHQQ %RZPDQ µ(QF\VWDWLRQ &RQWDLQPHQW DQG &RQWURO LQ ,VUDHOL ,GHRORJ\ DQG 3UDFWLFH¶
Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. XLIV, No. 3, Spring 2015, pp. 6-16. 
16
 Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, translated by Daniel Heller-
Roazen (Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press, 1998), p. 18. 
17
 $QGUH\ 0DNDU\FKHY DQG$OH[DQGUD <DWV\N µ8QORFNLQJ 3ROLWLFDO %RUGHUV ,PSOLFDWLRQV IRU
EU-5XVVLD 5HODWLRQV LQ (DVWHUQ (XURSH¶ Problems of Post-Communism, Vol. 61, No. 6, 
November-December 2014, pp. 34 and p. 35. 
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UHJLPHV¶18 The establishment in March 1995 of the Schengen Area of passport-free 
travel within Europe entailed the hardening of external borders, which in the case of 
Ukraine affected not just its frontier with the EU but also the Ukraine-Russia border.19 
The crystallisation of frontiers between the various zones of Europe reflects the 
radicalisation of normative confrontation and assumes a harsh physical form. Europe as a 
whole in undergoing a type of self µHQF\VWDWLRQ¶ RQ LWV RXWHU ERUGHUV LQ UHVSRQVH WR
LQWHUQDO µSRVW-PRGHUQ¶ IOXLGLW\ DQG the tide of miserable humanity pressing at its gates. 
Rather than ending, history appears to have come full circle, and the continent is entering 
a new era marked by the construction of walls, fences and other medieval remnants 
within the European polity. This reflects the broader resurgence of the new medievalism, 
with an array of overlapping political competencies and social forces eroding classical 
representations of the state.20 Post-Cold War Europe may well have become increasingly 
µSRVW-PRGHUQ¶;21 but at the same time it is assuming some pre-modern characteristics. 
Ken Jowitt¶V warning in the early 1990s about the onset of a µQHZZRUOGGLVRUGHU¶ proved 
prescient.22 Instead of inaugurating a sustainable and inclusive peace, the last 25 years 
have been characterised by a growing range of challenges to European and global order.23  
The only question is what we should call this new period of turbulence. Andrew 
Monaghan is right to argue against the attempt to shoehorn present events into the 
procrustean bed of a µnew Cold War¶ narrative.24 1HYHUWKHOHVV WKH µ&ROG :DU RI WKH
PLQG¶DV.HQ%RRWKDOUHDG\QRWHGLQWKHODWHVZDVQHYHURYHUFRPH25 Booth notes 
that the systemic struggle between the US and the Soviet Union ended with the 
disintegration of the latter in 1991, but the bipolar mindset continued, and in his view the 
historical Cold War was only one manifestation, admittedly one of the most intense, of 
what he identifies as WKH µLQWHUQDWLRQDO SROLWLFDO FXOWXUH RI FRQIOLFW¶26 It is this 
characteristic, with politics reduced to a morality play, which was replicated in new 




 Tatiana Zhurchenko, Borderlands in Bordered Lands: Geopolitics of Identity in Post-Soviet 
Ukraine (Stuttgart, Ibidem-Verlag, 2010). 
20
 Jan Zielonka, Europe as Empire: The Nature of the Enlarged European Union (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2007). See also Jan Zielonka, Is the EU Doomed? (Global Futures) 
(Cambridge, Polity Press, 2014). 
21
 The locus classicus of the argument is Robert Cooper, The Breaking of Nations: Order and 
Chaos in the Twenty-First Century (New York, Atlantic Monthly Press, 2003), which develops 
the argument originally presented as The Postmodern State and the World Order (London, 
Demos, 1998). 
22
 Ken Jowitt, New World Disorder: The Leninist Extinction (Berkeley, University of California 
Press, 1992). 
23
 Ivan Krastev and Mark Leonard, The New European Disorder (London, European Council on 
Foreign Relations, November 2014), 
http://www.ecfr.eu/publications/summary/the_new_european_disorder322, last accessed 14 
August 2015; Bobo Lo, Russia and the New World Disorder (Washington, DC, Brookings, 
2015). 
24
 Andrew Monaghan, $µ1HZ&ROG:DU¶"$EXVLQJ+LVWRU\0LVunderstanding Russia (London, 
Chatham House Research Paper, May 2015). 
25
 .HQ%RRWK µ&ROG:DUVRI the 0LQG¶ LQ.HQ%RRWKHGStatecraft and Security: The Cold 





forms in the post-Cold War era, giving rise to the cold peace. This was a tySHRIµPLPHWLF
&ROG:DU¶LQZKLFKWKHDQWDJRQLVPVSUDFWLFHVDQGUHVSRQVHVRIWKHHDUOLHUSHULRGZHUH
reproduced while refusing to acknowledge the inherently conflictual character of the 
statecraft of the period.27 This was a classic case of mimetic rivalry, as powerfully so 
brilliantly by René Girard, in which both Russia and America, desired the object of the 
RWKHUV¶GHVLUHQDPHO\UHFRJQLWLRQRIJUHDWSRZHUVWDWXV28  
If the Cold War was at root an ideological conflict over different representations 
of community and social power, reminiscent of the great wars of religion that culminated 
LQ WKH VXLFLGDO 7KLUW\ <HDUV¶ :DU IURP  WR WKH series of treaties in 1648 that are 
known to posterity as the Treaty of Westphalia, then the conflicts of the new era are 
DERXW FXOWXUHV RI SRZHU )RU WKH RQH VLGH ZKDW LV WHUPHG µGHPRFUDF\¶ LV WKH RQO\
appropriate form for a modern society, while on the other side the substantive features of 
democracy, such as the rule of law, secure property and individual freedom are not 
denied, but are embedded in cultures of power which place greater weight on collective 
responsibility, communal (traditional) values and authoritative rights than the liberal 
VRFLHWLHV RI WKH ZHVW 7KLV LV E\ QR PHDQV WKH VDPH DV 6DPXHO +XQWLQJWRQ¶V µFODVK of 
FLYLOL]DWLRQV¶ ZKLFK XVHG UHOLJLRQ DV WKH PDUNHU RI GLVWLQFWLYH FXOWXUDO FRPSOH[HV.29 In 
cultures of power religion is only one marker among many, and includes what used to be 
called political culture as well as ideational representations of the proper role of the state, 
relations between the state and the market, as well as authority in general. The struggle is 
not so much between normative orders as about the role that norms should play in 
shaping relations between states. The thirty years of neoliberal pre-eminence in the 
Atlantic world has influenced cultures of power across the world, including Russia and 
China, yet these two affirm development trajectories that remain located in their own 
understanding of the particular challenges facing their countries. Affirmations of political 
sovereignty are a synonym for the attempt to retain control over their own histories and a 
rejection of meta-historical claims that developmental problems resolved elsewhere are of 
universal applicability.  
The fundamental tension is between contrasting appreciations of historical time. 
In the post-Cold War era the concept of revolution has returned to its earlier meaning, a 
representation of the cyclical nature of human endeavour, although its modern 
connotation of a sudden breakthrough in the life of a society to some sort of superior 
condition has not disappeared.30 Contemporary liberal democracy is shaped by the 
specific conditions of its emergence in western societies, but in much of the 
transitological literature norms and practices that took generations to devise in one 
                                                 
27
 6HH 5LFKDUG 6DNZD µ7KH &ROG 3HDFH 5XVVR-:HVWHUQ 5HODWLRQV DV D 0LPHWLF &ROG :DU¶
Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Vol. 26, No. 1, 2013, pp. 203-224. 
28
 Wolfgang Palaver, 5HQp*LUDUG¶V0LPHWLF7KHRU\, translated by Gabriel Borrud (East Lansing, 
Michigan State University Press, 2013). 
29
 6DPXHO3+XQWLQJWRQµ7KH&ODVKRI&LYLOL]DWLRQV"¶Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 3, Summer 
1993, pp. 23-49; Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World 
Order (New York, Simon & Schuster, 1996). 
30
 For an analysis of the shifting meanings within the framework of Begriffsgeschichte 
(conceptual history), see 5HLQKDUW .RVHOOHFN µ+LVWRULFDO &ULWHULD RI WKH 0RGHUQ &RQFHSW RI
5HYROXWLRQ¶ LQ .RVHOOHFN Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time, trans. by Keith 
Tribe (Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 1985 [1979]), in particular pp. 41-2. 
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context is applied as the solution to the problems of countries facing very different 
challenges. This type of revolutionary revisionism has undermined the foundations of 
European post-Cold War order. The specificity of the historical context is denigrated, and 
instead universal solutions are recommended. Curiously, progressive development today 
assumes a spatial rather than a temporal aspect.31 The ideology of the µUHWXUQWR(XURSH¶
contains aspirations for improved governance and standards of living, but it also entails a 
UHVSDWLDOLVDWLRQRISROLWLFVWKDWLVDWRGGVZLWKµSRVW-PRGHUQ¶notions of scapes and flows 
that define the claimed liquidity of the modernity associated with globalisation. By 
definition LI VRPH FRXQWULHV FDQ µUHWXUQ WR (XURSH¶ DW VRPH SRLQW WKHUH ZLOO EH D OLQH
differentiating them from those that cannot or will not. The contradiction between 
universalistic claims and the specificity of the historical experience that gave rise to these 
practices DFFRPSDQLHG E\ WKH ERUGHU µORFNLQJ¶ WKDW WKLV HQWDLOV provokes much of the 
present disorder.32  
 
Liminality and sovereignty 
 
7KHSUREOHPRIµWLPHOLQHVV¶LVXQLTXHO\DFXWHLQWKHFDVHRI5XVVLD1HXPDQQDQG3RXOLRW
apply the term hysteresis ± the resilience of historical affects on a physical or social 
organism ± to describe the long-term phenomenon of a Russia in which time is out of 
joint and in which the burden of history distorts the current appreciation of real time 
challenges.33 This is now compounded by the harshly spatialised quality imposed on 
temporal disjuncture. The Ukrainian wall seeks WRGHOLQHDWH WKH µ(XURSHDQ¶VRFLHWLHV WR
the west from WKH µEDUEDULDQV¶ WR WKH HDVW ,W is thus invested with global significance, 
representing the Ukrainian struggle as one for the very soul of Europe.34 This certainly 
was the way that the post-Maidan Kiev authorities portrayed the war against the 
insurgency in the Donbass.35 By contrast, Fyodor Lukyanov, the editor of Russia in 
Global Affairs, argues that the events in Ukraine, despite the depth of the tragedy, are 
µVRPHKRZSDURFKLDOWKDWWKLVREVHVVLRQZLWKSHULSKHUDOPDWWHUVLVRQO\DGLVWUDFWLRQIURP
PXFK ODUJHU DQG PRUH LPSRUWDQW SURFHVVHV¶36 The whole Ukraine crisis can be 
considered a case of hysteresis, where the cumulative memory of previous bending and 
                                                 
31
 A point made by Tony Judt in his Postwar: A History of Europe since 1945 (New York, 
Vintage, 2010). 
32
 For an analogous discussion, see Tony Judt, Ill Fares the Land: A Treatise on our Present 
Discontents (London, Penguin, 2011). 
33
 ,YHU % 1HXPDQQ DQG 9LQFHQW 3RXOLRW µ8QWLPHO\ 5XVVLD +\VWHUHVLV LQ 5XVVLDQ-Western 
5HODWLRQV RYHU WKH 3DVW 0LOOHQQLXP¶ Security Studies, Vol. 20, No. 1, 2011, pp. 105-137. See 
also ,YHU1HXPDQQµ5XVVLDLQ,QWHUQDWLRQDO6RFLHW\RYHUWKHLongue Durée: Lessons from Early 
5XV¶ DQG (DUO\ 3RVW-6RYLHW 6WDWH )RUPDWLRQ¶ LQ 5D\PRQG 7DUDV HG Russian Identity in 
International Relations: Images, Perceptions, and Misperceptions (London & New York, 
Routledge, 2012), Chapter 3. 
34
 See, for example, the interview by Sebastien Gobert with Petro Poroshenko in Kiev on 1 
$XJXVWµ8NUDLQLDQpresident says Putin wants the wKROHRI(XURSH¶Libération, 12 August 
2015, reproduced in -RKQVRQ¶V5XVVLD/LVW, No. 157, 2015. 
35
 )RU H[DPSOH µ8NUDLQH¶V <DWVHQ\XN SUHSDUHV *HUPDQ\ IRU 86$¶V ZDU¶  $SULO 
http://english.pravda.ru/world/europe/03-04-2015/130183-yatsenyuk_germany-0/, accessed 29 
July 2015. 
36
 )\RGRU/XN\DQRYµ5XVVLDPXVWexploit its pLYRW(DVW¶Moscow Times, 26 June 2015. 
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pressure prevents a release into that brave post-modern world that had been anticipated 
but so tantalisingly hidden in the cold peace years. The Ukraine crisis drags Europe back 
to an era that had been considered transcended, hence the parochial feel to the events, and 
it is hard to see anything other than the clash of retrogressive nationalisms at play. 
Instead of the elusive democratic peace based on international law and adaptive 
institutions of global governance, for Lukyanov the big story is the reconstitution of the 
East as a powerful new entity ± politically, geographically and culturally ± XQGHU&KLQD¶V
leadership. In the twentieth century Russia had embodied the East, but this had always 
been more of a rhetorical device than a substantive reality, since the modernity espoused 
by the Soviet Union was only an idealised variant of the modernity practiced in the West. 
,WLVIRUWKLVUHDVRQWKDW9LDWFKHVODY0RUR]RYODEHOV5XVVLDDµVXEDOWHUQHPSLUH¶. 5XVVLD¶V
vision of modernity in his view is ultimately derivative, generated by a Europe with 
whom it has traditionally had an ambivalent relationship; but its self-image as a great 
power perpetuates the imperial dimension, with profound consequences for its domestic 
and international policies.37 ,I 0RUR]RY¶V LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ RI WKH VSHFLILFLW\ RI 5XVVLDQ
postcolonialism is right, then it makes sense for the other post-Soviet Eurasian states to 
draw on the fount of modernity at its source rather than through the derivative, and no 
doubt distorted, model provided by Russia. Thus postcolonial discourse only reinforces 
the anti-FRORQLDOQDUUDWLYHVJHQHUDWHGE\WKH8NUDLQLDQµEDFNWR(XURSHUV¶38  
The spatialisation of the Ukrainian nationalist project has in turn provoked the 
UHVSDWLDOLVDWLRQ RI 5XVVLD¶V SROLWLFDO DVSLUDWLRQV QRWDEO\ WKURXJK WKH FUHDWLRQ RI WKH
Eurasian Economic Union (EEU). 7KH VDQFWLRQV DQG RWKHU µZDOOLQJ¶ GHYLFHV have 
UHLQIRUFHG 5XVVLD¶V ORQJ-term attempt to take advantage of the reconstitution of an 
economically dynamic and geopolitically separate East. However, this does not mean that 
Russia has repudiated its European and even its Western identity. Russia remains an 
intermediate state, in political terms liminal and as always µbetwixt and between¶WRXVH
9LFWRU 7XUQHU¶V SKUDVH the great processes of our time.39 The more dogmatic the 
DVVHUWLRQ RI D[LRPDWLF FKDUDFWHULVWLFV WKH PRUH 5XVVLD¶V LGHQWLW\ EHFRPHV IOXLG DQG
contingent. Equally, Ukraine as much as Russia is part of the broader post-Soviet 
postcolonial condition, where it is not clear who is the subaltern and who is the coloniser. 
Anti-colonialists in Ukraine have appropriated, sometimes in fruitful ways, postcolonial 
discourse to examine the dilemmas facing Ukrainian national development, although 
there is a tendency to reduce the whole question to the struggle against an alien 
colonising power.40  
This is countered by the traditional Russian view that the two countries have a 
shared history and culture, and that the fundamental challenge is to find a way of 
                                                 
37
 Viatcheslav Morozov, 5XVVLD¶V 3RVWFRORQLDO ,GHQWLW\ D 6XEDOWHUQ (PSLUH LQ D (XURFHQWULF
World (London, Palgrave Macmillan, 2015). 
38
 5LFKDUG6DNZDµ8NUDLQHDQGWKH3RVWFRORQLDO&RQGLWLRQ¶Open Democracy, September 2015. 
39
 7KHWHUPµOLPLQDO¶ LVGHULYHG IURP WKH/DWLQ WHUPµOLPHQ¶PHDQLQJ WKUHVKROG UHSUHVHQWLQJD
space of waiting, not knowing, transition and expectation. For a recent study, see Bjørn 
Thomassen, Liminality and the Modern: Living Through the In-Between (Farnham, Ashgate, 
2014). 
40
 0\NROD5LDEFKXN µ&XOWXUH DQG&XOWXUDO3ROLWLFV LQ8NUDLQH$3RVWFRORQLDO3HUVSHFWLYH¶ LQ
Taras Kuzio and 3DXO '¶$QLHUL HGV Dilemmas of State-Led Nation Building in Ukraine 
(Westport, CT, Greenwood Publishing, 2002), pp. 47-69. 
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accommodating differences within Ukraine and externally to devise a political 
community in which both countries could flourish. Instead, separation and division came 
to predominate. The fundamental struggle over what it means to be Ukrainian in the 
modern era opposes a monist version (which includes the Ukrainising ethnic nationalists 
but is not limited to them) to a broader pluralistic appreciation of the multiplicity of 
Ukrainian identities. These could have been (and may one day be) united under the 
banner of the constitutional patriotism of a civic nation, allowing Ukrainian culture and 
language to become universal while accommodating Russian and other languages and 
cultures.41 In the event, the triumph of a peculiarly aggressive form of Ukrainising 
nationalism in February 2014 exacerbated internal divisions and gave birth to the wall 
building project against its neighbour.  
The limes Germanicus was the system of frontier installations that defended the 
Roman Empire from German raids. Ukrainian wall-building symbolises a latter-day 
HQGHDYRXU WR GHIHQG µ(XURSHDQV¶ from the uncivilised Eurasian µEDUEDULDQV¶. This 
demonstrates how little has changed in the course of two thousand years. The limes 
Ukrainus illustrates the failure to transcend the logic of the Cold War to build a Europe 
µZKROH DQG IUHH¶. No less significant, it is a potent symbol of the fragmentation of the 
Ukrainian state-EXLOGLQJHQWHUSULVHDQGWKXVLWMRLQVWKHRWKHUJUHDWµZDOOLQJ¶SURMHFWVRI
our era that demonstrate not the strength of Westphalian sovereignty but its dissolution. 
The disorder in European affairs represents not a repudiation of the post-modern 
condition but is an essential part of the neoliberal order. The violence unleashed by what 
1DRPL .OHLQ FDOOV µGLVDVWHU FDSLWDOLVP¶ ZDV JUHDWO\ LQ HYLGHQFH LQ 5XVVLD HDUOLHU DQG
Ukraine today.42 $V :HQG\ %URZQ DUJXHV µ:KLOH PDQ\ RI LWV SURSRQHQWV IUDPH
neoliberalism as an alternative to the wars, coups, struggle, and strife of Realpolitik and 
paint a picture of a global order pacified by economic integration, it is no secret that 
neoliberal reforms are often ushered in by or generate a palpable share of violence that 
UHVXOWV LQ QHZ VHFXULW\ FRQFHUQV IRU HYHU\ UHJLRQ WKH\ WRXFK¶43 This applies to the 
European Union (EU) as a whole, which in the eyes of its critics has become transformed 
from a peace project to an instrument for the continuation of Cold War struggles in new 
forms. By engaging in un-negotiated enlargement into contested territory it was drawn 
into geopolitical conflict for which it had no effective instruments, and only reinforced its 
subordinate status within the Atlantic security community. This prompts the reflection 
that, having lost a broad continental European vision, it is the EU that has become the 
µVXEDOWHUQHPSLUH¶IRFXVLQJLWV LGHQWLW\RQDQ$WODQWLFLVPWKDWZDVRQFHDVVXPHGWREH
contingent and circumscribed. 
Brown stresses that the trend to build walls around and between states is a token 
not of their increased power but of the opposite. In conditions of so-called globalisation, 
the state is increasingly hollowed out as the economy becomes more autonomous, 
services traditionally carried out by a professional civil service or dedicated departments 
are outsourced, and the powerful transnational flows of migrants, capital, labour and 
services leave what remains of the state increasingly powerless. Thus, the new era of 
walls signals the waning of state sovereignty. $VVKHQRWHVWKHµIUHQ]LHGEXLOGLQJ¶RIWKH
                                                 
41
 For my examination of the issue, see Richard Sakwa, Frontline Ukraine: Crisis in the 
Borderlands (London and New York, I. B. Tauris, 2015). 
42
 Naomi Klein, The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism (London, Penguin 2008). 
43
 Wendy Brown, Walled States, Waning Sovereignty (New York, Zone Books, 2014), p. 95. 
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µQHZ ZDOOV VWULDWLQJ WKH JOREH¶ ZDV EHLng undertaken at precisely the time when 
µFUXPEOLQJRIWKHROG%DVWLOOHVRI&ROG:DU(XURSHDQGDSDUWKHLG6RXWK$IULFDZDVEHLQJ
LQWHUQDWLRQDOO\ FHOHEUDWHG¶44 When theorists of globalisation were celebrating the 
emergence of a world without borders, new barriers were going up across the world, as 
well as within countries in the form of gated communities. 
The Ukrainian wall is exceptional. It is designed as a defence against a traditional 
state, whereas mostly the new walls are reactions to transnational forces rather than 
international threats. This only reinforces the parochial and regressive nature of the 
struggle between Ukraine and Russia, locked in pre-modern conflicts that degrades their 
political cultures and returns the whole region to the war of all against all. Elsewhere, 
walls are a feature of the post-Westphalian world. This is not to suggest that nation-state 
sovereignty is µHLWKHU ILQLVKHG RU LUUHOHYDQW¶ ,QVWHDG %URZQ DUJXHV µWKH SUHIL[ ³SRVW´
signifies a formation that is temporally after but not over WKDWWRZKLFKLWLVDIIL[HG¶7KLV
very much applies to the post-&ROG:DUHUD%URZQFRQWLQXHV µ´3RVW´LQGLFDWHVDYHU\
particular condition of afterness, in which what is past is not left behind, but, on the 
contrary, relentlessly conditions, even dominates a present that nevertheless also breaks 
LQ VRPH ZD\ ZLWK WKLV SDVW ,Q RWKHU ZRUGV ZH XVH WKH WHUP ³SRVW´ RQO\ IRU D SUHVHQW
ZKRVHSDVWFRQWLQXHV WRFDSWXUHDQGVWUXFWXUH LW¶45 It is in this spirit that I examine the 
legacies of the Cold War and the pathologies of the post-Cold War condition. This is 
indeed a condition which is conditioned by the Cold War and mimics it in the form of the 
cold peace.  
 
The myth of Yalta 
 
7KH FROG SHDFH UHSUHVHQWHG D  \HDUV¶ FULVLV lasting between 1989 and 2014 before 
giving way to a new era of overt confrontation between Russia and the Western powers. 
The Ukraine crisis is only the latest symptom of the long-term failure to find an adequate 
post-Cold War µPRGHRIUHFRQFLOLDWLRQ¶on the European continent, and instead a whole 
set of divisive practices operated. While the causes of the Ukraine crisis remain 
contested, one essential point is often overlooked: the conflict was rooted in decisions 
made long before any fighting broke out. The roots of the gravest geopolitical crisis of 
our time lie in contesting interpretations of two events that helped shape the course of the 
twentieth century and continue to resonate today. The Yalta Conference of 4-11 February 
KHOGLQWKH/LYDGLDSDODFHRQWKHSHQLQVXOD¶Vsouth coast, and the Malta Summit of 
2-3 December 1989, held on two ships off Marsaxlokk Harbour, are either long-forgotten 
or poorly understood by many in the West. Though they were quite different in substance 
and historical context, both meetings sought (and ultimately failed) to produce a more 
stable European security order.  
The myth of Yalta is one of the most powerful in Russian historiography. In 
February 1945, when the fate of the small European countries trapped between the 
advancing Red Army and Western forces was to be decided, leaders representing the 
United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union gathered in Yalta to forge a post-war 
order for Europe. The military division of the continent forced Franklin D. Roosevelt, 
Churchill and Joseph Stalin to accept the idea of European pluralism²different social 
                                                 
44
 Brown, Walled States, p. 8. 
45
 Brown, Walled States, p. 21. 
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systems would have to learn how to co-exist by recognising the interests of the other and 
thereby limiting their own ambitions. This represented a type of forced geopolitical 
pluralism, although within the blocs ideological discipline was imposed. The great 
powers in the end managed European affairs by taking into account the realities of power 
and the interests of others, not because they necessarily approved of these interests but 
because rational statecraft required this recognition. This meant granting Stalin effective 
control over most of the territories liberated by the Red Army, while the Western part of 
the continent achieved unprecedented economic growth and stability within the 
framework of American hegemony. Although this system was always challenged by 
radicals on both sides and by those caught in the middle, the new European order created 
a stable state system and the framework for economic development.  
It may seem perverse after all these years to return to Yalta as one of the 
foundational events of European order. For the Central and East European countries, 
Yalta was less a myth than a brutal reality. As Jacques Rupnik so powerfully DUJXHVµ)RU
the nations of the Other Europe YalWDLVWKH³RULJLQDOVLQ´WKHIRXQGLQJP\WKRIDGLYLGHG
Europe. It has become synonymous with Sovietization and with the disappearance of the 
very notion of Central Europe¶,QVKRUWµEurope divided by non-European superpowers: 
that is the potent myth of <DOWD¶46 The Yalta conference also reflected the fissures in the 
Atlantic alliance. The rift in relations between Churchill and Roosevelt had been evident 
at the Teheran conference in November 1943 when the American president 
µRVWHQWDWLRXVO\FRXUWHG6WDOLn and was cool to Churchill, seeking to demonstrate that the 
Americans and WKH %ULWLVK ZHUH QRW ³JDQJLQJ XS´ DJDLQVW WKH 5XVVLDQV. From the 
American point of view, this was perfectly reasonable. By the end of the war the Soviet 
Union was going to be a stronger power than Britain, playing a greater role in world 
DIIDLUVDQGLWZDVDVKUHZGPRYHWRFRPHWRWHUPVZLWKWKHULVLQJVWDU¶47 In other words, 
Yalta presaged the power shift from Britain to the US. Nevertheless, the Yalta conference 
settled a whole range of detailed issues, including borders in Eastern Europe, spheres of 
influence, democratic elections in Poland and the project to create the United Nations. 
The participants agreed to the American plan for the establishment of a Security Council 
with fiYHSHUPDQHQWPHPEHUV &KXUFKLOO LQVLVWHGRQ)UDQFH¶V LQFOXVLRQHDFKRIZKLFK
had veto powers on Security Council resolutions.  
A myth is a way of freezing time. The Russian myth of Yalta confirms 5XVVLD¶V
status as a great power with legitimate security interests in a broader region, while the 
Western myth (although not couched in those terms) connects West European security 
and developmental interests with American hegemony. The Yalta conference enshrined a 
mutual understanding that the Soviet Union was a great power whose interests would 
henceforth have to be taken into account. It is for this reason that Yalta was so much 
appreciated by the Soviet Union, and has attained such a mythological status in Russia 
today. The seventieth anniversary of Yalta in 2015 was celebrated by numerous 
conferences and events UHLQIRUFLQJ WKH YLHZ RI 5XVVLD DV RQH RI WKH ZRUOG¶V JUHDW
sovereign powers. Above all, the Yalta Conference recognized that Red Army victories in 
the war gave the Soviet Union the right to be treated as an equal in deciding global issues. 
                                                 
46
 Jacques Rupnik, The Other Europe, revised and updated edition (London, Weidenfeld and 
Nicolson, 1989), p. 63. 
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 3KLOLS %HOO µ(XURSH LQ WKH 6HFRQG :RUOG :DU¶ LQ Paul Hayes (ed.), Themes in Modern 
European History 1890-1945 (London & New York, Routledge, 2008), pp. 249-273, at p. 264. 
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+HQFH5XVVLD¶V UHSHDWHGDVVHUWLRQ WKDWZKHQ5XVVLD LV LQYROYHGD ODVWLQJSHDFHFDQEH
secured ± as at the Congress of Vienna in 1815 or Yalta in 1945 ± but when it is 
excluded, as it was from the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 and the resulting Versailles 
Treaty, then peace is fragile and insecure.48 It is this status RI 5XVVLD DV DQ µHVVHQWLDO¶
nation in world affairs that Vladimir Putin has tried to restore. He has complained 
endlessly that in the post±Cold War years Russian views have been ignored, just as 
President Boris Yeltsin did before him, and any future Russian leader will do as well. On 
the Western side, challenges to the Atlantic alliance are considered heretical and 
dangerous. On both sides, the myth of Yalta has stymied creative thinking and the 
establishment of new institutions and processes reflecting not the Cold War but its 
transcendence.  
 
From Yalta to Malta and back 
 
When he came to power at the head of the Soviet Union in 1985, Gorbachev quickly 
signalled his commitment to serious domestic reform. In 1986, he launched what he 
FDOOHGµSHUHVWURLND¶WKHµUHVWUXFWXULQJ¶RIWKH6RYLHWV\VWHPZKLFKultimately became a 
JUDQG H[HUFLVH LQ WU\LQJ WR FUHDWH D µKXPDQH GHPRFUDWLF VRFLDOLVP¶49 Gorbachev 
encountered a sympathetic although tough interlocutor in the person of President Ronald 
Reagan, and soon the tensions of the Cold War began to ease. *RUEDFKHY¶VVSHHFKDWWKH
UN on 7 December 1988 represented the moment, according to Jack Matlock (the US 
ambassador to Russia at the time), when µ*RUEDFKHYSXEOLFO\FDOOHGRII WKH LGHRORJLFDO
&ROG :DU¶50 In his address to the Council of Europe in Strasbourg on 6 July 1989, 
*RUEDFKHY RXWOLQHG KLV LGHD IRU D µ&RPPRQ (XURSHDQ +RPH¶ that would unite the 
continent on the basis of a shared commitment to peace and development. He argued that 
different systems could coexist peacefullyQRWLQJWKDWµ1RZWKDWWKHWZHQWLHWKFHQWXU\LV
entering a concluding phase and both the post-war period and the Cold War are becoming 
a thing of the past, the Europeans have a truly unique chance ± to play a role in building a 
new world, one that would be worthy of their past, of their economic and spiritual 
SRWHQWLDO¶51 Gorbachev¶Vprogramme for geopolitical and normative pluralism in Europe 
since the mid-2000s has been taken up in the form of the Russian project for a µ*UHDWHU
(XURSH¶52 *RUEDFKHY¶VµQHZSROLWLFDOWKLQNLQJ¶SUHFLSLWDWHGWKH fall of the Berlin Wall on 
9 November 1989 and was a moment of unlimited opportunity to reunite the continent 
and overcome global confrontation. 
The Malta Summit of December 1989 represented the culmination of these 
developments. Gorbachev and the American President George H. W. Bush met to devise 





 This was the programmatic declaration of the 28th Congress of the CPSU, 2-13 July 1990, µ.
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51
 Mikhail GRUEDFKHY µ(XURSH DV D &RPPRQ +RPH¶ 6WUDVERXUJ  -XO\ 
https://chnm.gmu.edu/1989/archive/files/gorbachev-speech-7-6-89_e3ccb87237.pdf. 
52




ZKDW%XVKZRXOG ODWHUFDOO WKHµQHZZRUOGRUGHU¶53 As the Eastern European countries 
one by one shook off Soviet power and dismantled the communist system, Gorbachev 
confirmed that the Soviet Union would not intervene in the various revolutions. As 
$UFKLH%URZQSXWVLWµ%XVKKDGEHHQFRQYLQFHGLQWKHFRXUVHRIWKHSreceding months ± 
as the Soviet leadership made clear that it would not intervene militarily to put a stop to 
regime change in Eastern Europe ± that the new thinking was being matched by a 
FRPSOHWHO\QHZSDWWHUQRIEHKDYLRXU¶,QRWKHUZRUGVWKHµ%UH]KQHY GRFWULQH¶RIOLPLWHG
sovereignty was replaced by what the Soviet foreign ministry spokesman Gennady 
*HUDVLPRYFDOOHGWKHµ6LQDWUDGRFWULQH¶± µOHWWLQJWKH(DVW(XURSHDQVGRLW their ZD\¶54 
Although no agreements were signed, the two leaders had a chance to review the rapid 
changes taking place in Europe. At the concluding press conference Gorbachev declared, 
µ7KHZRUOGLVOHDYLQJRQHHSRFKDQGHQWHULQJDQRWKHU:HDUHDWWKHEHJLQQLQJRIDORQJ
road to a lasting, peaceful era. The threat of force, mistrust, psychological and ideological 
VWUXJJOHVKRXOGDOOEHWKLQJVRIWKHSDVW¶%XVKWRRZDVSRVLWLYH:HFDQUHDOLVHDODVWLQJ
peace and transform the East-West relationship to one of enduring co-operation. That is 
the future that Chairman Gorbachev and I bHJDQULJKWKHUHLQ0DOWD¶55 
The tumultuous events of autumn 1989 appeared to inaugurate a new era of peace 
and reconciliation. This would allow not only the reunification of Germany but above all 
the coming together of the European continent. Gorbachev understood that the Cold War 
stand-off between the Soviet Union and the Western powers served to undermine the 
development of both. The Malta meeting represented another moment, as at Yalta earlier, 
when the great powers held the fate of Europe in their hands. Gorbachev envisaged that 
Russia would remain a great power, but now one that worked cooperatively with the 
West. At the Malta meeting Gorbachev argued for the transcendence of Yalta and Malta. 
He called for the creation of a new dynamic in European international relations that 
would encompass the interests of both the small and great powers. This would be a 
multipolar Europe with space for experimentation and diversity. In the event, the Malta 
summit represented only a partial repudiation of the world born out Yalta. The changes 
focused only on the Eastern part of the continent and no institutions or processes were 
created that could invest in and maintain broader processes of continental reconciliation. 
The Malta summit registered the changed diplomatic and strategic balance of power but 
failed to transcend the logic which sustained that balance of power.  
Although Malta discussed the fate of Europe, only one part of the continent was 
represented at the summit. The tragedy of Malta is that Gorbachev was not talking with 
European leaders but with the president of the United States. Unlike at Yalta, there was 
no Churchill to speak on behalf of Europe. Not surprisingly, the idea of a µ*reater 
(XURSH¶ZDVWKHODVWWKLQJWKDW%XVKZLVKHGWRWDONDERXWVLQFHLWwould signal precisely 
what America had long feared: a split between the European and American wings of the 
Atlantic alliance. Equally, it was confirmed that the post-Cold War order would be built 
on the Helsinki Final Act of August 1975. Helsinki had confirmed Yalta, above all the 
borders and the framework for the conduct of relations between the great powers; but at 
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mechanism its transcendence. It established a particular method to overcome the politics 
of Yalta, which ultimately proved corrosive of post-Cold War international relationships. 
Instead of Gorbachevian geopolitical and ideological pluralism, a universalist agenda was 
pursued premised on the view that the task of the post-communist world was simply to 
adjust its historical time to that of the West. It also failed to instantiate an independent 
West European presence as an independent interlocutor. 
The emphasis on human rights at Helsinki and its legacy in the CSCE and then 
the Organisation for Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) began the shift from the realist focus 
on structural relations between great powers, the principle of Yalta, to systemic issues, the 
question of regime type and the associated emphasis on normative values. Already in his 
VWXG\ ZKDW KH GXEEHG WKH µWZHQW\ \HDUV¶ FULVLV¶ ( + &DUU KDG critiqued the inherent 
K\SRFULVLHVDQGGRXEOHVWDQGDUGV LQKHUHQW LQ WKLVVRUWRI µLGHDOLVW¶SROLWLFV56 In the end, 
FULWLTXH RI 5XVVLD¶V V\VWHPLF IDLOLQJV LQ WKH SRVt-Cold War era provoked what was 
perceived to be the denigration of its interests. The incommensurability of historical time, 
or, more simply, different perceptions of the historical challenges facing the country, 
eroded trust and mutually beneficial interactions. This was accompanied by a dramatic 
decline in the quality of pan-European diplomacy, and instead a tone of hectoring and 
mutual recrimination came to predominate. This ultimately was the basis for the twenty-
ILYH\HDUVRIWKHµFROGSHDFH¶EHWZHHQ the Malta meeting in 1989 and the Euro-Maidan 
revolution in Kiev in 2014. 
The opportunity for a common victory that Gorbachev presented at Malta was 
squandered. Perceiving the decline of Soviet power, Bush seized the opportunity to 
strengthen US dominance. Although the personal relationship with Gorbachev was a 
VWURQJRQHDQG%XVKZDVDFXWHO\VHQVLWLYHRIWKH6RYLHWOHDGHU¶VDFFXPXODWLQJGRPHVWLF
problems and the growing wave of criticism of his policies, the shift in the balance of 
power was palpable.57 The Soviet Union had now effectively become a hostage of 
American good will, something that the hard-nosed American domestic constituencies 
would only ration out for tangible advantage. Thus, over the course of the Malta summit 
the pattern of post±Cold War politics was established, and the conditions were created 
that ultimately exploded in Ukraine in 2014. Instead of an equitable and inclusive post-
Cold War settlement, an honourable draw, which was so much desired by Gorbachev, the 
Cold War ended in a sharply asymmetrical manner. Rather than establishing a new 
framework for the conduct of power relations, Malta was indeed a µPLVVHGRSSRUWXQLW\¶
to place European and global international relations on a new basis and instead only 
registered the changed balance of power.58 Gorbachev proposed a way to transcend the 
                                                 
56
 E. H. Carr, 7KH7ZHQW\<HDUV¶&ULVLV-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International 
Relations, Reissued with a New Introduction and additional material by Michael Cox (London, 
Palgrave, 2001 [1939]). 
57
 For a detailed and perceptive account, see Jack F. Matlock, Autopsy on an Empire: The 
$PHULFDQ $PEDVVDGRU¶V $FFRXQW RI WKH &ROODSVH RI WKH 6RYLHW 8QLRQ (New York, Random 
House, 1995). 
58
 This is argued most eloquently and eruditely by Joshua R. Itzkowiz-Shifrinson µ7KH 0DOWD





logic of conflict and subordination, but another path was chosen that imposed a new 
hierarchy based on a normative agenda that ultimately made diplomacy impossible and 
prevented reconciliation. Europe was unable to emerge from the shadow of Yalta as an 
autonomous subject of international politics. The quarter century of the cold peace ended 
in something akin to a new Cold War. This was as predictable as it was avoidable. The 
writing was long on the wall ± and what the writing said was that the wall would be 
coming back. The medium was indeed the message. 
 
The asymmetrical end of the Cold War 
 
The Malta meeting has become a symbolic turning point in East-West relations but it 
represented only the partial repudiation of the Yalta conference. A number of elements 
were involved. First, the lands in between, including Germany, reclaimed their political 
subjectivity. By October 1990 the process of German unification was complete, much to 
the alarm of François Mitterand and Margaret Thatcher. In response to the perceived 
WKUHDWWKDWWKHHQKDQFHGSRZHURIWKHXQLWHGFRXQWU\ZRXOGFUHDWHDµ*HUPDQ(XURSH¶the 
road to Maastricht was taken WRIRUJHDµ(XURSHDQ*HUPDQ\¶, which in the end led to the 
creation of the euro and thus only confirmed the predominance of a German Europe. 
Second, the problem of European security was unresolved, with a quarter-century long 
debate over the role of NATO and the consequences of its enlargement to former Soviet-
bloc territory. Third, issue of winners and losers at the end of the Cold War represents an 
ideological debate that acts as the surrogate for a discussion on the appropriate model of 
European order.  
The Malta summit was a moment of power transition. The Atlantic powers 
appeared to triumph, and Russia entered a long period of decline, a retreat that only 
began to be reversed when Putin rose to power in 2000. Malta was also a moment of 
transition from the geopolitical pluralism and concert of powers symbolized by Yalta to a 
unipolar security order in Europe. 7KH (8 EHFDPH WKH FHQWUH RI D µ:LGHU (XURSH¶
DJHQGD ZKLFK V\VWHPLFDOO\ H[FOXGHG WKH JUHDWHU (XURSHDQ DVSLUDWLRQV RI *RUEDFKHY¶V
idea for a common European home This was accompanied by the delegitimation of 
systemic alternatives. Normative pluralism came to an end (in other words, there would 
no longer be variety of social systems, in this case the liberal capitalism of the West and 
the more humane and democratic socialism that Gorbachev sought to build in the Soviet 
Union), and instead the virtues of a particular type of liberal capitalism were proclaimed 
as universal. The neoliberal revolution later merged with elements of authoritarian 
restoration in Russia to create a peculiar hybrid system that jealously guarded its 
prerogatives at home while asserting its assumed great power status abroad. The western 
experience of democracy, the product of a long process of historical evolution and torn 
E\VRPHSRZHUIXOVRFLDODQGSROLWLFDOFRQWUDGLFWLRQVEHFDPHWKHµJROGVWDQGDUG¶IRUWKH 
rest of humanity.  Thus Malta represents the moment when geopolitical and systemic 
pluralism died in Europe. The peculiar myth of 1989 as a moment of liberation and the 
triumph of a particular social order stymied more creative attempts to devise pan-
European modes of reconciliation. 
Everything that has happened in the quarter century since the Malta meeting is 
little more than a playing out of the strategies adopted at that time. 0DWORFNQRWHVµWRR
many American politics looked at the end of the Cold War as if it were a quasi-military 
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YLFWRU\UDWKHUWKDQDQHJRWLDWHGRXWFRPHWKDWEHQHILWHGERWKVLGHV¶59 The West assumed a 
triumph that effectively extinguished the hope of a true partnership with Russia. Under 
President Bill Clinton NATO began an enlargement that brought it to the very borders of 
5XVVLD DQG WKH :HVW QXUWXUHG LWV RZQ P\WK RI WKH µHQG RI KLVWRU\¶. The triumph of 
Western market democracy against a debilitated opponent became part of a triumphalist 
discourse that reinforced division rather than multivalent reconciliation. ,Q 0DWORFN¶V
YLHZ ERWK µ$PHULFD DQG 5XVVLD KDYH ERWK IXQGDPHQWDOO\ PLVXQGHUVWRRG KRZ DQG ZK\
the Cold War ended, and it [0DWORFN¶Vbook] shows how that crucial misconception gave 
rise to misconceived policies that continue to tKLVGD\¶There were serious attempts to 
downplay the triumphalist rhetoric and to engage with Russia, but this too often was 
perceived to be condescending when it was not derogatory.60  
Menon and Rumer, in their recent study of the Ukraine crisis, note that Europe 
had learned the lesson of the catastrophic mistakes made after the First World War by 
LPSRVLQJ WKH KXPLOLDWLQJ 9HUVDLOOHV SHDFH RQ *HUPDQ\ 7KH\ QRWH WKDW DIWHU  µWKH
major powers failed in one crucial respect: they failed to devise a blueprint for Europe 
that would have enmeshed the vanquished nation ± Germany ± in a new European 
VHFXULW\ QHWZRUN¶ 7KH SULFH IRU WKH IDLOXUH ZDV WKH 6HFRQG :RUOG :DU µEXW [Europe] 
learned the lesson of the previous disaster and, after 1945, secured Germany in the web 
RIWUDQVDWODQWLFLQVWLWXWLRQVWKXVHQVXULQJLWVUROHDVWKHPRGHO(XURSHDQFLWL]HQ¶61 It was 
this lesson that was forgotten after Malta. :KLOH *HUPDQ\¶V SODFH LQ post-war Europe, 
after the initial period of reconstruction and in conditions of Cold War, was never in 
question, Menon and Rumer continue,  
 
That was not the case with Russia after 1991. Its place in post-Cold War Europe, 
whole and free, has always been tenuous. NATO membership for Russia was 
never seriously considered, and if it came up. It was only as a far-fetched, 
theoretical possibility. Devising a new security arrangement to replace both Cold 
War structures ± the Warsaw Pact and NATO ± was never considered either. 
7KHUHZDVQHYHUDQ\TXHVWLRQDVWR1$72¶VIXWXUHDIWHUWKH&ROG:DULW would 
continue, period.62  
 
1RWRQO\ ZRXOG1$72 FRQWLQXHEXW LWZRXOG H[SDQGDOO WKHZD\ WR5XVVLD¶VERUGHUV
0DWORFN UHLWHUDWHV WKLV SRLQW µ7KH &OLQWRQ DGPLQLVWUDWLRQ ZLWKRXW DQ\ SURYRFDWLRQ, in 
effect repeated a fundamental mistake made at Versailles in 1919. By excluding Russia 
from the peace settlement when it was not even a defeated party but actually one of the 
victors over the Communist Soviet Union, the Clinton administration practically ensured 
WKDWWKHUHZRXOGEHQRQHZZRUOGRUGHULQ(XURSH¶63  
 Various structures were devised to manage the risks and mitigate the potential 
sense of threat. 5XVVLD ZDV LQFOXGHG LQ 1$72¶V 3DUWQHUVKLS IRU 3HDFH SURJUDPPH LQ
1994; the NATO-5XVVLD )RXQGLQJ $FW RQ 0XWXDO 5HODWLRQV LQ 0D\  µGHILQHG WKH
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goals and meFKDQLVPV RI FRQVXOWDWLRQ¶ LQFOXGLQJ WKH FUHDWLRQ RI WKH 1$72-Russia 
Permanent Joint Council and a NATO commitment not to station troops permanently in 
the newly-acceded countries; and in 2002 the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) was 
established as a forum to advance cooperation. None of these mechanisms worked in 
moments of crisis ± just when they were most needed. All of these were mere palliatives 
in the absence of a coherent strategy vis-à-vis Russia. In practical terms three options 
were available. First, full-scale engagement, which could have taken the form of Russia 
joining a transformed NATO or equivalent structure, as an equal founding member; or 
the abolition of NATO and the strengthening of the OSCE or some equivalent as the 
supreme security body on the continent. Moscow at various points showed a willingness 
to engage in either of these variants.  
The second option was to adopt a hedging strategy, which effectively entailed the 
strengthening and enlargement of Western institutions, while trying to mitigate the effects 
on Russia and other neighbours. This is the position adopted by NATO, but also by the 
(XURSHDQ 8QLRQ 'HVSLWH DOO WKH WDON RI µSDUWQHUVKLS¶ IURP WKH YHU\ EHJLQQLQJ 5XVVLD
ZDV DQ LQGLJHVWLEOH DQG DOLHQ HQWLW\ IRU WKH µZLGHU (XURSH¶ PRGHO RI development, 
whereby the Brussels-centric world would encompass the smaller states of Central and 
South-Eastern Europe and find some way of managing the relationship with those left 
RXWVLGH DERYH DOO WKURXJK YDULRXV PHFKDQLVPV RI µH[WHUQDO JRYHUQDQFH¶ 7hus, as the 
president of the European Commission, Romano Prodi, put it on 6 December 2002, they 
ZRXOG µVKDUH HYHU\WKLQJ ZLWK WKH 8QLRQ EXW LQVWLWXWLRQV¶64 Designed to prevent new 
GLYLGLQJ OLQHV EHWZHHQ WKH (8 DQG LWV QHLJKERXUV WKH LGHD ZDV WR FUHDWH D µUing of 
IULHQGV¶HQJDJHGLQDQLQWHJUDWLRQSURFHVVWKDWZRXOGQRWQHFHVVDULO\UHVXOWLQDFFHVVLRQD
policy that resulted in the creation of the European Neighbourhood Policy in 2004. In 
2009 this assumed a pronounced geopolitical aspect with the launch of the Eastern 
Partnership (EaP) in May of that year. It was no accident that the Ukraine crisis was 
SURYRNHG E\ 3UHVLGHQW 9LNWRU <DQXNRY\FK¶V GHFLVLRQ LQ 1RYHPEHU  WR SRVWSRQH
signing the Association Agreement with the EU. 
The third option was a transformation of the type envisaged by Gorbachev. One 
YDULDQW RI WKLV ZDV WKH FRQVFLRXV VWUDWHJ\ RI FUHDWLQJ D µJUHDWHU (XURSH¶ ZKLFK LWVHOI
FRXOGWDNHPDQ\IRUPV2QHRIWKHVHZDVWKHFUHDWLRQRIDµXQLRQRIXQLRQV¶ZKHUHE\WKH
EU and Russia would create some sort of pan-continental union along the lines of a Euro-
Asian union. This would have created a dynamic whereby the logic of conflict on the 
continent would be transcended, based on economic and security integration of the sort 
applied to Germany and Japan after the Second World War&RXQWULHV LQ WKH ODQGV µLQ
EHWZHHQ¶FRXOGMRLQWKH(8LIWKH\PHWWKHDSSURSULDWHFRQGLWLRQVRUUHPDLQSDUWRIWKH
pan-European construction. Either way, they would not be faced with a stark choice 
between the EU or Eurasia, and new dividing lines by definition would have been 
DYRLGHG7KLVZRXOGKDYHEHHQDQHIIHFWLYHµPRGHRIUHFRQFLOLDWLRQ¶ in both institutional 
and ideational terms. This model of European development would not only have 
transcended the logic of conflict on the continent, but it would also have transcended the 
need for the Atlantic security community in its traditional form. By contrast, the 
asymmetrical end of the Cold War only perpetuated the institutions and postures spawned 
by that conflict. A Europeanisation of Europe would have changed and possibly made 
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redundant $PHULFD¶VUROHLQ(XURSHDQDIIDLUV, and it precisely this element of the legacy 
of Yalta that raised traditional defensive reactions. Proposals for the transformation of 
European politics have instead been condemned as part of the traditional Russian attempt 
WRGULYHDµZHGJH¶EHWZHHQWKHWZRZLQJVRIWKH$WODQWLFDOOLDQFH 
For this reason the hedging strategy predominated. The Bucharest NATO summit 
RI$SULOXQHTXLYRFDOO\VWDWHGWKDWµNATO weOFRPHV8NUDLQH¶VDQG*HRUJLD¶V(XUR-
Atlantic aspirations for membership in NATO.  We agreed today that these countries will 
become members of NATO¶.65 The 2008 Russo-Georgian war demonstrated that Russia 
would not tolerate being encircled by NATO countries, and the Ukraine crisis was a 
predictable second act. The Atlantic alliance was caught in a logical trap: enlargement 
was not intended to threaten Russia, but in the absence of an effective mode of 
reconciliation, enlargement inevitably became a hedging strategy in case Russia reverted 
to what was assumed to be some sort of innately aggressive and threatening stance; but 
the very act of enlargement provoked a negative reaction that became more assertive and 
ultimately threatening. The hedging strategy became self-fulfilling, provoking precisely 
the outcome that it was ostensibly intended to avert. As I argue in my study of the 
8NUDLQHFULVLVµ1$72H[LVWVWRPDQDJHWKHULVNVFUHDWHGE\LWVH[LVWHQFH¶66   
$V 0HQRQ DQG 5XPHU QRWH LWV DGYRFDWHV µKDYH QR JURXQGs to lament that 
engagement with Russia has failed, as their own advocacy of hedging undercut 
HQJDJHPHQW¶VSURVSHFWV¶.67 Gorbachev, who had done so much to bring the original Cold 
War to an end, could only lament in his speech on the 25th anniversary of the fall of the 
Berlin Wall on 8 November 20WKDWWUXVWKDGEHHQHURGHGµthe trust that was created 
by hard work and mutual effort in the process of ending the cold war. Trust ± without 
ZKLFK LQWHUQDWLRQDO UHODWLRQV LQ WKH JOREDO ZRUOG DUH LQFRQFHLYDEOH¶ He noted that the 
roots of the current crisis lay in the events of the 1990s, and argued that  
 
Instead of building new mechanisms and institutions of European security and 
pursuing a major demilitarization of European politics ± as promised, incidentally, 
LQ 1$72¶V /RQGRQ 'HFODUDWLRQ ± the West, and particularly the United States, 
declared victory in the Cold War. Euphoria and triumphalism went to the heads of 
Western leaders. Taking advantage of Russia's weakening and the lack of a 
counterweight, they claimed monopoly leadership and domination in the world, 
refusing to heed words of caution from many of those present here. The events of 
the past few months [in Ukraine] are consequences of short-sighted policies, of 
VHHNLQJ WR LPSRVHRQH¶VZLOO DQG faits accomplis while ignoring the interests of 
RQH¶VSDUWQHUV68 
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There can be few more damning indictments of the pattern of post-Cold War 
international relations by one more qualified to pass judgement. 
 
Back to the wall 
 
The last straw was the perceived attempt WR ZUHVW 8NUDLQH DZD\ IURP 0RVFRZ¶V
economic and security sphere. Russian intervention in Ukraine in 2014, including the 
repatriation of Crimea and support for the insurgency in the Donbass, is perceived by the 
West to represent a violent challenge to the system of international law. However, from 
WKH .UHPOLQ¶V SHUVSHFWLYH²and, it must be said, from the point of view of the great 
majority of Russian citizens²the struggle over Ukraine is considered to be a desperate 
ODVWVWDQGWRGHIHQGQRWRQO\5XVVLD¶VLQterests but also that alternative YLVLRQRI(XURSH¶V
GHVWLQ\ HQXQFLDWHG E\ *RUEDFKHY LQ WKH &ROG :DU¶V G\LQJ GD\V 3XWLQ¶V 5XVVLD LV D
deeply conservative country at home, and in international affairs it claims to be defending 
a status quo threatened by whDW KDV FRPH WR EH VHHQ DV WKH :HVW¶V UHYLVLRQLVP
manifested by the restless urge to remodel regimes in its own likeness while pushing its 
VHFXULW\V\VWHPWR5XVVLD¶VERUGHUV Although the repatriation of Crimea was a revisionist 
act, t was not part of a revisionist strategy.  
NATO¶V efforts to manage its enlargement with Russia were ultimately only 
mitigation measures and did not deal with the fundamental issue of the structural 
exclusion of Russia from the Atlantic security system. In this way, at the end of the Cold 
War, the cold peace was born. Long before Putin assumed the presidency in 2000, NATO 
was perceived by Moscow to be a security threat, DQGDOORI0RVFRZ¶VDWWHPSWVWRFUHDWH
some sort of pan-European security dynamic were blocked. The Western powers (and 
even more so, not surprisingly, the Central and East European countries, driven by their 
own myth of Yalta) were content to defend the peace order emerging out of the Helsinki 
process, and considered any return to the great power politics represented by Yalta a 
retrograde step. The transformatory potential for European international relations outlined 
by Gorbachev in the late perestroika years, notably at Malta, was left unfulfilled. Instead 
of pan-continental solutions to problems of European security and identity, Atlanticist 
and wider Europe approaches predominated, in which Russia did not have a stake or 
substantive voice. Russia was ultimately prompted to articulate and institutionalise 
Eurasian, greater Asian and even global alternatives, institutionalising the new division of 
Europe.  
This brings us back to where we started. If the West had truly opened itself up to 
*RUEDFKHY¶VYLVLRQDU\FRQFHSWRI(XURSHDQWUDQVIRUPDWLRQZHZRXOGQRWEHIDFLQJWKH
catastrophic breakdown of the European security system provoked by the conflict in 
Ukraine. Gorbachev came to Malta with radical ideas about transcending the Cold War 
logic of ideological conflict between East and West. Instead, this logic was reaffirmed, 
but with the opposite polarity. The Atlantic alliance system emerged as the supreme 
power on the European continent, while ideas of geopolitical and systemic pluralism 
were negated. Soviet concerns and interests were increasingly marginalized, as were 
those of the newly formed Russian Federation. Although the former communist countries 
joined NATO by invitation and desire, all this did was to perpetuate the logic of 
confrontation and division, undermining the security of all.  
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Malta turned out to be not just a lost opportunity but also a political disaster. 
Malta represented not the repudiation of the politics of Yalta but their inversion. Instead 
of establishing a new pattern of international politics, it reconfirmed the predominance of 
great power politics, but now in a system that lacked alternatives, and to which was 
added a normative dynamic GULYHQ E\ WKH KXPDQ ULJKWV DJHQGD RI +HOVLQNL¶V µWKLUG
EDVNHW¶. The security concerns and historical specificity of others were effectively 
delegitimated. The EU turned into one of the pillars of the larger Atlantic community, 
although its member states continued to exercise autonomy in the management of their 
foreign and defence policies. NATO steadily enlarged to the point that it threatened to 
encircle Russia from the south and west. NATO is an association to ensure the collective 
security of its members, but in the absence of a mode of reconciliation of the type 
outlined at Malta, its enlargement generated fears and insecurities typical of a security 
dilemma. From a geopolitical perspective, it is irrelevant whether NATO is a benign or 
PDOLJQIRUFH LIRQHRI(XURSH¶VJUHDWSRZHUVFRQVLGHUV LWD WKUHDW, and the dismissal of 
these concerns only exacerbated mistrust. The hedging strategy reflected the 
asymmetrical end of the Cold War and intensified the unstable conditions of the cold 
peace. ,QWKLVFRQWH[WLWLVQRWLQDSSURSULDWHWRWDONRIWKHµGHDWKRI(XURSH¶LQWKHVHQVH
WKDWWKHµ(XURSHZKROHDQGIUHH¶SURPLVHGDWWKHHQGWKHHQGRIWKH&ROG:DUKDVLQVWHDG
given way to new divisions and conflicts.69  
Gorbachev understood where all this was heading, and since his forced retirement 
in December 1991 he repeatedly lamented this outcome. It is for this reason that he 
EURDGO\HQGRUVHG3XWLQ¶VSROLFLHVUHJDUGLQJ8NUDLQHLQ, although he was critical of 
the way that the regime had evolved.70 The forty-five years shaped by Yalta gave way to 
another twenty-five years of a world shaped by Malta. As the Ukraine crisis makes 
painfully clear, fundamental questions of European security remain unresolved. The cold 
peace was always pregnant with conflict, and it has now given birth, opening up a new 
era of confrontation and war. The West lives in a world where the myth of its victory in 
the Cold War is considered the foundation of the contemporary international order, while 
for Russia the enduring myth of betrayal and marginalisation drives it to challenge the 
practices if not the principles of European order. For stability in Europe, the myths and 
mistakes of the last quarter century need to be challenged. The foundations of European 
and global security need to be rethought. With our backs to the wall, the stakes could not 
be higher. 
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